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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Philip Andrew Turney appeals from his judgment of conviction for two counts of 
felony DUI, with a persistent violator enhancement. Mr. Turney was convicted following 
a jury trial and the district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of life, with fifteen 
years fixed. Mr. Turney now appeals, asserting that, when he was convicted of two 
counts of felony DUI, he was twice placed in jeopardy for the same crime, and that his 
life sentences are excessive. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinns 
Early in the morning on December 24, 2004, Boise Police officers Brian Hagler 
and Tony White were conducting a traffic stop on Vista Avenue when another vehicle 
crashed into Officer Hagler's vehicle, which in turn hit Officer White's vehicle. (Tr., p.61, 
L.10 - p.62, L.5, p.66, Ls.5-20.) Officer White testified that, right after the collision, he 
saw a man "at the scene and saw him roll out and get on the ground right here and just 
start flailing." (Tr., p.82, Ls.13-15.) 
The individual at the scene was Mr. Turney; the vehicle he was in was a taxi and 
his city taxi license was in the vehicle. (Tr., p.85, Ls.1-8.) Mr. Turney's blood alcohol 
concentration was .16. (Tr., p.676, Ls.21-22.) Both at the scene, and at and trial, 
Mr. Turney denied being the driver of the vehicle and consistently maintained that his 
friend, Tom Sage, was the driver. (Tr., p.85, L . l l ,  p. 260, Ls.15-19 p.767, Ls. 21-25.) 
Mr. Turney always maintained that he was in the back seat of the vehicle at the time of 
the collision. (Tr., p.318, Ls. l-2.) 
Mr. Turney explained that on the evening of December 23, 2004, he and 
Mr. Sage were in the "taxi line" and they agreed to meet for a drink after their last fares 
of the night. (Tr., p.753, Ls.13-19.) Around 11:50 that evening, Mr. Turney picked up 
Mr. Sage from his residence on Phillipi Street and they drove to the Fireside Inn on 
State Street. (Tr., p.754, Ls.14-19.) Before they entered the bar, Mr. Turney removed 
his glasses and placed them in the console between the seats; Mr. Turney required 
glasses to drive. (Tr., p.755, L.13 - p.756, L.23.) The glasses were found in the 
vehicle. (Tr., p.879, Ls.18-20.) Mr. Turney testified that he gave his car keys to 
Mr. Sage and told him that they needed to find a "drive-away, somebody to come pick 
us up because I wasn't going to drive after having a drink." (Tr., p.757, Ls.4-7.) 
Mr. Turney explained that "each and every time" he drank with Mr. Sage, they had 
arranged for a "drive-away." (Tr., p.758, Ls. 1-2.) 
Mr. Turney and Mr. Sage were at the Fireside Inn for approximately 40 or 45 
minutes; Mr. Turney had two mixed drinks. (Tr., p.759, Ls.21-23.) They left to go to the 
Navajo Room on Orchard Street. (Tr., p.761, Ls.15-16.) Mr. Turney stated that he got 
in the back of the taxi and Mr. Sage drove; at this point Mr. Sage had had only one 
beer. (Tr., p.761, Ls.1-15.) 
Mr. Sage and Mr. Turney arrived at the Navajo Room around 1:00 a.m.; Mr. 
Sage went up to the bar and Mr. Turney went to speak to a couple of acquaintances he 
saw. (Tr., p.764, Ls.1-10.) Mr. Turney drank four mixed drinks at the Navajo Room. 
(Tr., p.764, Ls.21-24.) 
Mr. Turney testified that at about 2:00 a.m., he left the bar and got into the back 
seat of his vehicle; he fell asleep waiting for Mr. Sage and their "drive-away," Sam 
Binnion. (Tr., p.767, Ls.5-10.) Sam Binnion testified that he received a call from either 
Mr. Turney or Mr. Sage about getting picked up; he explained that, because it was 
Christmas Eve, he was too busy to get them immediately but could do so in about an 
hour. (Tr., p.865, Ls.15-24.) Mr. Turney explained that he woke up to "a huge crash, a 
very loud noise," and that he was "very forcefully vaulted into the rear seat and the 
console area of the cab and I [came] to rest face down with my arms up underneath me 
on the floor of the cab." (Tr., p.767, L.21 - p.768, L.2.) He testified that he saw 
Mr. Sage "roll over out of the driver's seat of the car and exit the car." (Tr., p.769, Ls.1- 
4.) Nobody else testified to seeing Mr. Sage at the scene. 
Mr. Sage testified, and he confirmed that he went to both the Fireside and the 
Navajo Room with Mr. Turney that evening; however, he said that he drove 
Mr. Turney's vehicle back to his house, and then Mr. Turney drove off. He testified that 
the following morning he received a call from Mr. Turney, who informed him that he 
needed to tell the police that he, and not Mr. Turney, was driving. (Tr., p.446, Ls. 4-8, 
p.448, Ls.23-24, p.450, Ls.4-20.) 
Juanita Cunningham, who lived with Mr. Sage in 2004, testified that on the 
evening in question Mr. Sage returned home and there "was a bunch of white stuff on 
[his clothes]" that looked like "flour or powder." (Tr., p.905, L.21 - p.906, L. l l .)  
According to Ms. Cunningham, Mr. Sage told her that he was the one who hit the police 
officers with the vehicle. (Tr., p.913, Ls.24-25.) 
Mr. Turney was charged with two counts of aggravated DUI, with separate 
counts for each of the two officers who were injured, along with a persistent violator 
enhancement. (R., pp.25, 36.) Mr. Turney was convicted on all charges, and the 
district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of life, with fifteen years fixed. 
(R., p.158.) This appeal followed. (R., p.162.) 
ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. Turney twice put in jeopardy for the same offense when he was charged 
and convicted of two counts of aggravated DUi when there was only one act of 
driving? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed concurrent sentences of 
life, with fifteen years fixed? 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Turnev Was Twice Put In Jeopardy For The Same Offense When He Was 
Convicted Of Two Separate Counts Of Aqqravated DUI When There Was Onlv One Act 
Of Drivinq 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Turney contends that, when he was charged with two separate counts of 
aggravated DUI, his double jeopardy rights under both the United States and ldaho 
Constitutions were violated. He contends that, given that there was clearly only one act 
of driving, he could have been charged with and convicted of only one count of 
aggravated DUI. Accordingly, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate one of his 
two convictions. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because double jeopardy claims are grounded in the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the ldaho Constitution, they 
present questions of law which are subject to free review. State v. Byington, 139 ldaho 
516, 518, 81 P.3d 421,423 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. Mr. Turnev's Double Jeo~ardv Claim Is Properlv Before This Court 
Mr. Turney acknowledges that no objection was made in the district court to 
bringing two charges of aggravated DUI. However, an appellate court may always 
review "fundamental" errors made by district courts, even where no objection to those 
errors was made below. State v. Rozajewski, 130 ldaho 644, 645, 945 P.2d 1390, 1391 
(Ct. App. 1997). "A fundamental error is one that so profoundly distorts the proceedings 
that it produces manifest injustice, depriving the criminal defendant of the fundamental 
right to due process." Id. It "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights, 
goes to the foundation of the case, or takes from the defendant a right which was 
essential to his or her defense and which no court could or ought to permit to be 
waived." Id. 
It is well-established that double jeopardy claims are assertions of fundamental 
error. See State v. Swader, 137 ldaho 733, 736, 52 P.3d 878, 881 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(observing that even where there was no objection below, "review is proper upon a 
determination of fundamental error," then stating that it would review the defendant's 
double jeopardy claim, thereby implicitly holding that that claim did assert "fundamental 
error"); Sfafe v. Ayala, 129 ldaho 911, 919-920, 935 P.2d 174, 182-183 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(implicitly agreeing that double jeopardy claims are, in fact, claims of fundamental error 
by acknowledging that the appellant had not raised such a claim below, but, 
nevertheless reaching the issue on appeal). This makes sense, given that the right to 
not be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense is a basic right specifically and 
unequivocally guaranteed by both the United States and the ldaho Constitutions. Thus, 
regardless of whether such a claim was raised in the district court, and Mr. Turney 
acknowledges that it was not, it can now be made on appeal. 
D. Mr. Turnev Was Twice Put In Jeopardv For The Same Offense When He Was 
Convicted Of Two Separate Counts Of Aqqravated DUI When There Was Only 
One Act Of Driving 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that "[nlo person 
shall be . . . subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." 
Thus, this "Double Jeopardy Clause 'protects against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same 
offense." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1 977) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). Likewise, Article I, Section 13 of the ldaho Constitution 
provides that "[nlo person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." 
Under both the United States and ldaho Constitutions, the ldaho courts have 
explicitly held that a defendant is twice put in jeopardy for the same offense when he is 
charged with two offenses even though only one offense has been committed. State v. 
Major, 11 1 ldaho 410, 414, 725 P.2d 115, 119 (1986). See also State v. Jones, 140 
ldaho 41, 48, 89 P.3d 881, 888 (Ct. App. 2003); Miller v. State, 135 ldaho 261, 267, 16 
P.3d 937, 942 (Ct. App. 2000). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
question of "[wlhether a course of conduct constitutes one offense or several can be a 
troublesome question." Major, 11 1 ldaho at 414, 725 P.2d at 119. 
In the present case, Mr. Turney was charged with two offenses even though, 
even assuming that he did all that he was accused of having done, he was guilty of, at 
most, one offense of aggravated DUI. Thus, he contends that, by charging and 
convicting him of two separate offenses, he was placed in jeopardy twice, thus violating 
the double jeopardy provisions of both the United States and ldaho Constitutions. 
One of the early cases to have dealt with the question of "[wlhether a course of 
criminal conduct should be divided or aggregated," was Major. In that case, the ldaho 
Supreme Court held that if the conduct in question "constituted 'separate, distinct and 
independent crimes,"' the defendant should be charged with multiple crimes but, if not, 
then the defendant should only be charged with a single crime. Major, 11 1 ldaho at 
414, 725 P.2d at 119 (quoting State v. Hall, 86 ldaho 63, 69, 383 P.2d 602, 606 (1963)). 
Of course, since the "separate, distinct and independent crimes" analysis is a somewhat 
circular one, the Court went on to note that the inquiry involves both a look at the 
circumstances of the defendant's conduct, as well as the "intent and objective" behind 
his conduct. Id. (quoting In re Ward, 64 Cal.2d 672, 51 Cal. Rptr. 272, 275, 414 P.2d 
400, 403 (1966)). Thus, the Court ultimately held that where the defendant's criminal 
conduct (in stealing multiple items) arose out of "a single incident or pursuant to a 
common scheme or plan reflecting a single continuing [criminal] impulse or intent," he 
was properly charged with only one offense. Id. (quoting State v. Lloyd, 103 ldaho 382, 
383, 647 P.2d 1254, 1255 (1982)). 
In Major, the ldaho Supreme Court cited with approval a rule from California, 
which states that "a charge of multiple counts of violating a statute is appropriate only 
where the actus reus prohibited by the statute, the gravaman of the offense, has 
occurred more than once." Major, 11 1 ldaho at 415, 725 P.2d at 120 (citing Wilkoff v. 
Superior Court, 696 P.2d 134, 137 (Cal. 1985)). The ldaho Supreme Court also noted 
the one exception to this rule, "where a single act of violence is committed with an intent 
to harm more than one person with means likely to harm more than one person, and 
results in multiple victims, multiple punishments are warranted and permitted." Id., I? I 
ldaho at 415 n.l, 725 P.2d at 120 n.1 (citing Wilkoff, 696 P.2d at 138.) 
Idaho's aggravated DUI statute provides, "[alny person causing great bodily 
harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to any person other than himself 
in committing a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a) or (l)(c), ldaho 
Code, is guilty of a felony . . . ." I.C. § 18-8006(1) (emphasis added). These provisions 
make it "unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, . . . or who has 
an alcohol concentration of 0.08 . . . to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle within this state . . . ." I.C. fj 18-8004(1)(a)'. Therefore, in order for I.C. § 18- 
8006 to apply, a defendant must commit a violation of I.C. fj 18-8004. There can be no 
dispute in this case that only one violation of I.C. 18-8004 occurred - regardless of 
who was driving, there was only one act of driving. ldaho Code section 18-8006 is 
simply an enhancement of the crime of DUI - i t  makes a DUI which causes great bodily 
harm a felony. 
California, whose rule the ldaho Supreme Court adopted in Major, agrees. 
Wilkoff, the very case cited with approval by the ldaho Supreme Court, concerned 
multiple counts of aggravated DUI when only one act of driving occurred. In Wilkoff, 
the California Supreme Court stated, "[tlhe unlawful act denounced by the Vehicle Code 
is the 'mere act of driving a vehicle upon a public highway while intoxicated'; the act is 
either a misdemeanor or a felony, depending on whether personal injuries result 
therefrom. The felony section simply 'graduate[s] the punishment according to the [more 
serious] consequences of the forbidden act."' Wilkoff, 696 P.2d at 138 (citations 
omitted.) The court concluded that "[tlhe fact that there are several victims cannot 
transform the single act into multiple offenses." Id. (citations omitted.) The Wilkoff 
Court also analyzed vehicular manslaughter by comparison, concluding, "[tlhe actus 
reus of vehicular manslaughter is homicide-the unlawful killing of a human being. When 
a defendant commits several homicides in the course of a single driving incident, he or 
she has committed the act prohibited by the statute several times. Thus, the Courts of 
The only substantive difference between I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a) and (l)(c) is that (l)(c) 
applies to "commercial" motor vehicles and l(a) applies to "a motor vehicle." See 
I.C. § 18-8004(1). 
Appeal have consistently upheld multiple counts of vehicular manslaughter, while 
prohibiting multiple counts of felony drunk driving." Id. 
Like California law, Idaho's DUI statute "felony section simply graduate[s] the 
punishment according to the [more serious] consequences of the forbidden act." Id. 
Further, like California, the ldaho Court of Appeals has concluded that vehicular 
manslaughter is an act of violence against a person and thus permits multiple 
punishments based on multiple victims. State v. Lowe, 120 ldaho 391, 392, 816 P.2d 
347, 348 (Ct. App. 1990). In Lowe, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was proper to 
charge both aggravated DUI and vehicular manslaughter because vehicular 
manslaughter was a crime of violence. Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Swanstrom 
noted that, "as Wilkoff makes clear, a different rule may apply to crimes such as 
aggravated DUI under I.C. § 18-8006(1)." Id. at 393, 816 P.2d at 350. Judge 
Swanstom noted that "we do not need to decide here whether aggravated DUI is a 
'crime of violence against the person."' Id. 
Considering that the ldaho Supreme Court cited with approval Wilkofs rule 
regarding the difference between ordinary crimes and crimes of violence against the 
person, and that Wilkoff specifically held that an aggravated DUI was not a crime of 
violence against the person because the actus reus was driving while intoxicated, there 
can be no doubt that ldaho law should be in accord. Like California's DUI statutes. 
Idaho's DUI laws simply raise the punishment for DUI to a felony when great bodily 
injury occurs. Therefore, Mr. Turney could only be charged with one count of 
aggravated DUI, and by being convicted and sentenced for two, he was twice placed in 
jeopardy for the same crime. See State v. Major, 111 ldaho 410, 414, 725 P.2d 115, 
119 (1986). One of his convictions must therefore be vacated 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Concurrent Unified Sentences 
Of Life. With Fifteen Years Fixed 
A. Introduction 
The district court abused its discretion by imposing life sentences, with fifteen 
years fixed. 
6. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Concurrent Unified 
Sentences Of Life. With Fifteen Years Fixed 
Given any view of his character, the nature of the crime, and the goals of 
sentencing, Mr. Turney's sentences are excessive. Where a defendant contends that 
the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 ldaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The ldaho Supreme Court has held that, "[wjhere a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence." Sfafe v. Jackson, 130 ldaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d 
1372, 1373 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 ldaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 75 
(1979)). Mr. Turney does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. 
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Turney must show that in light 
of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. 
Id. (citing Sfate v. Broadhead, 120 ldaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 (1991) 
(overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 ldaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992)). 
The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment, are: (1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 ldaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978) (overruled on other grounds by 
State V. Coassolo, 136 ldaho 138 (2002)). 
Mr. Turney addressed the district court at the sentencing hearing. He stated, "I'm 
mindful that this was a horrific accident and I don't undermine the injuries that these 
officers were caused, that it impacted their family and loved ones in significant ways. 
Nor do I dispute that I've had many problems in my past with law enforcement, that I 
have made many mistakes and I'm not proud of them." (Tr., p.1033, L.21 - p.1034, 
L.3.) "But each and every time I've made a mistake, I have always admitted what I did, 
accepted the responsibility and the just punishment that went along with that. Every 
time for these 20 years." (Tr., p. 1034, Ls.3-6.) 
Mr. Turney maintained that he was "not driving that car when it crashed," but 
acknowledged that "the jury found me guilty" and that it was up to the district court to 
impose the "right and proper sentence." (Tr., p.1034, Ls.20-25.) Mr. Turney stated, "I 
don't believe my life is a throw-away life. I don't consider myself a bad father. I was 
working hard to provide for her. I was seeing her, my daughter." (Tr., p.1035, Ls.1-5.) 
Counsel for Mr. Turney informed the court that he has always been willing, and was still 
willing, to submit to a polygraph test, and so was Juanita Cunningham. (Tr., p.1027, 
L.14 - p.1028, L.7.) Counsel also noted for the court that, with all of his previous 
criminal activity, Mr. Turney "made statements, made confessions, made admissions, 
was forthright and said I did what I did and I must be responsible for what I did." 
(Tr., p.1029, Ls.13-16.) 
In addition to being truthful in the past, Mr. Turney has potential for the future. 
He was working full-time at the time of the events in this case, and he denied having 
any problems maintaining stable employment or having any limitations that would hinder 
his ability to find employment. (PSI, p.12.) Mr. Turney has clerical, computer, and 
customer service skills; he stated that one day he would like to own his own business as 
he enjoys meeting people and establishing a clientele. (PSI, p.12.) 
Under these circumstances, Mr. Turney asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing excessive sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Turney requests that this Court vacate one of his convictions for aggravated 
DUI due to the double jeopardy violation. Also, he requests that this Court reduce his 
remaining sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand his case for a new sentencing 
hearing. Alternatively, if this Court does not find a double jeopardy violation, he 
requests that this court reduce both his sentences as it deems appropriate, or remand 
his case for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 12'~ day of September, 2008. /I 
Deputy ta Appellate Public Defender I\ 
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